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China’s Economic Reform and Regional Productivity Differentials 
 




Reform of Chinese economy, especially the Urban Reform announced in 1984, has 
decentralized government control over the economy and encouraged freer trade, domestic as well 
as international. Consequently, strengths and weaknesses of geographic regions emerge and each 
region may specialize according to its comparative advantage. The abandonment of hitherto 
regional equality policy produces an anxiety over worsening regional disparity especially between 
the Coastal East and the Interior West. The reform policy is based on the Chinese leaders’ belief 
that allowing some areas to get rich ahead of others produces a trickle-down of prosperity to less 
developed interior regions. Is the trickle-down consistent with the reality, especially with the 
phenomenon of the Coastal-led development triggered by the “Open Door” policy for foreign 
investment and trade? This paper examines the pattern of changes in total factor productivity 
differentials in industry across regions of China during 1986-1991, a period posterior to initiation 
of the industrial reform. The estimates of the panel data production function model, with regional 
and temporal variations in levels of productivity, confirm regional convergence of total factor 





Economic reform in China, especially the Urban Reform announced in 1984, is 
characterized by a reduction of central control over the economy and introduction of market 
forces.
1 The decentralization has encouraged inter-regional trade utilizing comparative 
advantage as opposed to regional self-sufficiency. New regional strengths and weaknesses 
have been emerging since the reform began. Especially, the decentralization combined with 
the open door policy for foreign investment and trade benefits the more advanced Coastal 
Region. This may worsen regional development disparity. 
The reformers’ apparent logic behind decentralization and freer inter-regional as well 
as international trade is that the prosperous coast would establish links to both foreign 
markets and interior provinces, and lead industrial concentration to generate technological 
 
* MCI and Department of Economics, State University of New York-Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, 
E-mail: yoon@binghamton.edu, respectively. We thank Thomas Lyons for comments. 
1. The Twelfth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China announced in October 1984 that ‘defects in the 
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advances. Eventually the Coastal-led development would produce a  trickle-down of 
prosperity to less developed interior regions.   
However, this strategy has resulted in growing conflicts between the developed coast 
and other underdeveloped regions. The conflicts are most intensely felt by those in the 
Western Region.  The issue is also political, because this region is heavily populated by 
non-Han minorities. This has led to the concept of the east-west divide in China, and the 
argument for a more equitable regional policy instead of the current regional specialization 
policy based on comparative advantage and inter-regional/international trade.   
If there are some forces that can effectively trickle-down the benefits of the Coastal-led 
development, the regional inequality problem may not necessarily worsen. Although the 
trickle-down theory of economic development in China is largely discredited by many,
2 it 
may find support in the convergence hypothesis in economic growth literature: an economy’s 
productivity level has a strong inverse correlation with its productivity growth rate. 
The Neoclassical Growth Model predicts that if economies are similar with respect to 
preferences and technology, poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones. Baumol 
(1986) regards convergence as a productivity-enhancing public good which takes place as 
the fruits of each industrialized economy’s productivity-enhancement efforts are ultimately 
shared by others. Although some economic theories predict convergence among countries, 
the empirical evidence has been a subject of debate. Many studies show that convergence 
pattern is not a universal phenomenon and may exist only within certain groups. Abramovitz 
(1986) argues that an economy’s potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is 
technologically backward, but when social capabilities are sufficiently developed to permit 
successful exploitation of technologies.  Social capabilities include experience with organi- 
zation and management, institutions and markets capable of mobilizing capital, openness to 
competition, and the state of education. 
The phenomenon of convergence along with its accompanying theories has a very 
important policy implication for recent economic development in China, supporting the logic 
underlying the Coastal-led development as it relates to regional disparity. If there is a force 
leading convergence trend, the strategy that allows the more developed coastal provinces to 
get rich first would eventually benefit all other regions, and enhance the productivity level 
for the whole country in the long run. Development for the interior provinces would be only 
a question of time. 
If the main source of convergence is innovation sharing, and if the rapidity of the 
innovation sharing process depends on the social capabilities, then changes in the economic 
system would have a great impact on the pattern of convergence. If the reform from a central 
planning system to the market mechanism facilitates inter-regional trade and communications 
in goods, resources, information, and technology, the institutional change can enhance social 
capabilities and rapid information sharing. Then, the reform would reinforce the trend of 
convergence rather than that of divergence.   
Previous studies of Chinese economy have dealt with various aspects of convergence. 
Dollar (1990) and Jefferson and Xu (1991) presented evidence of productivity convergence 
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among industrial enterprises in terms of total factor productivity and factor returns, 
respectively. Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992) and Jefferson and Xu (1994) reported 
convergence of factor returns between state and collective industry and among large- and 
medium -sized state enterprises, respectively. Jian, Sachs, and Warner (1996) found regional 
convergence in real per-capita income in 1978-1990. However, none of the past studies treat 
regional convergence of industrial productivity. 
This study examines the pattern of changes in total factor productivity differentials in 
manufacturing across regions of China, and determines whether regional convergence of 
industrial productivity actually emerged in the period following the Urban Reform which 
was implemented with full strides by 1986. The study employs a panel data production 
function model to analyze province-level data from 1986 to 1991 for 28 provinces of China. 
The model allows for cross-sectional a nd temporal variation in levels of technical 
inefficiency to estimate time-varying productivity levels for regions, without invoking strong 
distributional assumptions on technical inefficiency. Different from the standard panel data 
model, our model includes a time function whose parameterization varies across regions.   
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II presents a summary of the 
economic reform of China. Section III describes the data and the econometric model. Section 
IV reports the estimated results of the model and their interpretations. Section V concludes 
the paper. 
 
II. Economic Reform 
 
Reforms of the collective economic system of China started with Rural Reforms in 
1978, which raised the long-depressed state procurement prices for agricultural products, 
provided the land lease to individual farmers, and abolished eventually the mandatory state 
production plans in agriculture.
3 The highly successful Rural Reform gave impetus to 
reforms in industry. Industrial reforms began with the Urban Reform which was announced 
in late 1984 and has proceeded with full steam since 1986. Simultaneous with the industrial 
reforms was regional development reform which discarded regional self-sufficiency. It 
emphasized regional specialization according to comparative advantage, and encouraged 
inter-regional as well as international trade. 
 
1. Urban Reform   
 
The Urban Reform enhanced the role of market forces in the industrial sector. 
Specifically, the reform which continues into the 1990’s includes price reform, management 
reform, and labor reform of the state-owned enterprises.   
 
a. Price Reform 
 
By the early 1980’s several types of prices coexisted in China. They range from the 
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state-determined fixed prices for essential producer goods to the market determined free 
prices. In 1984, producer goods whose output was above-plan level and many daily-use 
commodities were freed from the state price fixing so that their prices could be determined 
by supply and demand. The reform is incomplete in that a two-tier system of state and free 
prices continues to date, especially for producer goods. But the gap between the state and 
free prices tends to diminish over the years. 
 
b. Management Reform 
 
The Urban Reform shifted management responsibility of state owned enterprises from 
the state to the enterprises and introduced profit incentive for them. First, the enterprises 
acquired decision-making power in production as well as in investment. The contractual 
responsibility system, begun in 1986 and widely implemented in 1987-88, imposes a contract 
between a state enterprise and the state. The enterprise is granted authority for management 
decisions, while it must guarantee to pay to the state an agreed amount of the after-tax profit. 
The state is obligated to supply the enterprise raw materials and energy at fixed prices. The 
enterprise could use retained earnings for plant expansion. The decentralized production- 
investment decisions allowed the managers to pursue their own enterprise interests. 
Second, the enterprise under the contractual responsibility system maintains profit 
incentive since the enterprise can keep for itself some of the profit in excess of the set 
amount. This built-in profit incentive for enterprises is specified by the enterprise tax system, 
a system of profit sharing between the state and the enterprises, which replaces the old 
system of unified receipts and allocations by the state. Under the old system the state took 
the profits of state enterprises and covered their losses so that managers had little incentive 
for profit maximization. The enterprise taxation system imposes on profits of large- and 
medium -sized firms a flat tax rate of 55% on their net profit after the industrial-commercial 
tax. The remaining 45% of the profit was divided between the enterprise and the state. The 
specific profit shares of the state and the enterprise were determined by the rate schedule 
specified in the contract between them. Small firms were allowed to keep the profit left after 
payment of a progressive corporate income tax. As a result, firms could keep the more 
above-quota profit, the more profit they made.
4 For loss making enterprises, the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law was enacted later, in 1988, which gives bankruptcy warnings and then 
declares bankruptcy at the reorganization period to insolvent enterprises.   
 
c. Labor Reform 
 
Two types of reforms were made in labor. First, the wage reform of 1985 dismantled 
the egalitarian unified wage system to increase inter-grade wage differentials. It also 
introduced performance-based wages so that workers earn higher wages the more effort they 
put in and the more profit their firm makes. Thus, individual workers’ performances as well 
as the firm’s overall performance determine wages. Second, employment reform was made 
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initially through the new labor contract system of 1986 which abolished lifetime employment 
of state workers among new hires. The labor reform culminates later in the job tenure reform 
of 1988 which authorized the state enterprises to dismiss surplus workers. This smash the 
iron rice bowl employment reform continues amidst the social problem of the jobless 
amounting to 2.3% unemployment rate in 1989, a clear indication of China’s resolve to 
enhance economic efficiency. 
 
2. Regional Development Reform 
 
Prior to the reform era, the Chinese leadership promoted regional equality not only for 
the communist ideal of equality but also for military reasons. In the event of civil war or 
invasions, smaller units of equally developed, self-sufficient regions would have a higher 
survival probability than the integrated whole. The regional self-sufficiency is reflected in 
Table 1 which shows that the industrial sector accounts for one third or more of the national 
income in almost all provinces. This policy of regional uniformity/equality was costly in 
sacrificed efficiency (see Yang (1990)). Still it did not prevent big regional disparity in per 
capita industrial output which continued well into the 1980’s as shown in Table 2.   
In the 1970’s after the Cultural Revolution, spatial d ecentralization began, as 
provincial and county governments assumed control over the economy, replacing the central 
government planning. Decentralized government authority allowed each province to keep 
more of its revenue. Due to profit sharing between the state and the enterprises introduced by 
industrial reforms, more profitable firms within a province meant more revenues for the 
province. The common profit-revenue motive of the provincial government and the firms 
fosters inter-provincial trade and hence  interprovincial competition of state-owned 
enterprises, while inter-firm competition within a province is limited by the local government. 
The resulting development of each province according to its regional comparative advantage 
means that the regional uniformity forced by the central government planning is replaced by 
regional diversity.   
Another factor conducive to regional diversity is the coastal development. Government 
policy favors the coast in terms of higher investment and the concessions granted for foreign 
capital. Chinese leadership opened up for foreign investment and trade a few Special 
Economic Zones on the south coast in 1980, granting them special development incentives 
and privileges, which were later extended to the fourteen port cities and then to the entire 
Coastal Region.
5 These policies, combined with the coast’s historical advanced economic 
position, insured that the Coastal Region would prosper with reform. The apparent logic 
behind this open door policy was that the coast would establish links to both foreign markets 
and interior provinces. The benefits were to be many, such as the development of low-wage, 
labor-intensive exports to pay for needed imports; industrial concentration to generate 
 
5.  The four Special Economic Zones are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou. Fourteen port cities are 
Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Dalian, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuz hou, 
Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai. For development of the southeastern coastal provinces, see Lyons and Nee 
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technological advances; and, perhaps most important, the eventual trickle-down of prosperity 
to the less developed areas of the interior. Interior development, then, would be only a 
question of time. 
 
3. Reforms and Regional Disparity in Industry Productivity 
 
The reforms have resulted in shifting development priorities from regional self- 
sufficiency to regional specialization and trade based on regional comparative advantage. 
The reforms may or may not increase regional disparity in development. On the one hand, 
economically prosperous areas and their firms can invest the benefits from their traditional 
comparative advantages for further development, worsening the disparity. On the other hand, 
new strengths and weaknesses emerge among regions as the reforms continue. Areas which 
previously had the advantage of getting more support from the central planning system may 
lose their ground in the decentralized economy. Previously less developed areas may acquire 
new advantages to become winners in the competition. As the convergence hypothesis 
predicts, least developed regions may grow fastest to reduce regional disparity. 
However, industrial and regional reforms and especially the concomitant Coastal-led 
development have added to the inter-regional tension in the country. People in the inland feel 
left behind, or deliberately neglected, under state policies which so clearly favor the coast. 
This issue raises a serious question about the relationship between the more-developed coast 
and the less-developed interior: Do the reforms and the accompanying Coastal-led 
development worsen productivity disparity in industry across regions in China? According to 
the second column of Table 2, although the output growth rate over 1987-1991 is highest in 
the southeast coast, that of the western region is also very high. The growth rate of the 
central region is lower than that of the western region, but higher than that of the northeast 
coast, which grew least among the four regions. The poor growth performance of the most 
developed northeast vis   vis the good performance of the least developed west seems to 
point to convergence rather than divergence of industry growth across regions. To examine 
more thoroughly the pattern of the regional productivity disparity in the aftermath of the 
initiation of the economic reform,  the next section provides an econometric model to 
estimate the regional total factor productivity differentials over the post reform era. 
 
III. Data and the Model 
 
1. Data Description 
 
This study uses province level panel data which consists of annual data for 1986-1991, 
the era posterior to the Urban Reform, regarding twenty-eight of thirty provinces (including 
three municipalities) of the People’s Republic of China. Tibet is excluded because some of 
the relevant data is not available. Hainan, the new province started in 1988, is also excluded. 
All data in this study are taken from the State Statistical Bureau of China. Specifically, the 
data for output and input variables are from the China Industrial Economy Statistical 
Yearbook. This yearbook contains more detailed and consistent data for industrial analysis 
than the China Statistical Yearbook which was used by most of the previous industrial LIU AND YOON: CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM AND REGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS 
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studies. All price indices are from the China Price Statistical Yearbook.   
 
a. Region Dummies 
 
The government designates the 28 provinces of China geographically into three 
macro-regions: the Coastal, Central, and Western Region. Instead of this official tripartite 
regionalization, we divide China into four regions for our analysis. We split the Coastal 
Region into two areas, and also make some other changes based on the economic 
characteristics of provinces. Region 1 is one part of the Coastal Region which encompasses 
four provinces (including three municipalities): Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin municipalities, 
and Liaoning Province. This is the most developed and industrialized area with the highest 
industry shares in total national income (see Table 1) and with the highest ratios of national 
average of industrial output per capita (see Table 2) in 1986. State-owned, large- and 
middle-sized enterprises dominate in this region (see Table 3). Region two is the other part 
of the Coastal Region, comprising six provinces along the southeast coast: Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, Shandong, Fujian, and Guangxi. All Special Economic Zones and most of the 
Open Cities and priority development areas are located in this region. For these provinces in 
the region except Guangxi, proportions of state-owned, large- and middle-sized enterprises 
are much lower than all other provinces (see Table 3). Region 3 is basically the Central 
Region, totaling ten provinces: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Hubei, Shanxi, Hunan, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hebei, and Sichuan. It includes Hebei from the Coastal Region and Sichuan from the 
Western Region, considering their economic characteristics are similar to Region 3. Inner 
Mongolia, though located in the Central Region, is included in Region 4, since its 
characteristics are similar to the Western Region. Region 4 is basically the Western Region 
(with the exception of Inner Mongolia), and includes eight provinces: Xinjiang, Qinghai, 
Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Quizhou, and Inner Mongolia, which is the least 
developed area and is inhabited heavily by non-Han minorities. Their ratios of national 
average of industrial output per capita and shares of national industrial output are quite low 
relative to all other provinces (see Table 2). 
 
b. Adjustment for Output Variable 
 
The output variable in this study refers to net output value (in ten million yuan). The 
difference between net output value and value added (which is a usual proxy of output for 
production function analysis) is that the former excludes depreciation. The reported net 
output value (NOV) in current prices needs adjustments. The reported NOV is gross output 
value ( GOV) minus material cost ( MC) and depreciation. Due to underdeveloped factor 
markets, more so than to the product markets, officially assessed  MC (including raw 
materials and utilities) reflects government-controlled prices so that NOV may amplify the 
measurement error. To minimize the error, we deflate MC by the price index for material, 
Pm(t). The deflator for GOV, the output price index  P(t), for each province is computed as the 
weighted average of the producer sale price indexes of 14 industrial sectors, weights being 
respective sectoral shares in the province. It is observed that prices of raw materials and 
utilities increased much faster than output sale prices. This is due partly to the demand and 
supply situations and partly to government price control policies. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Table 1   National Income by Province, 1986 




in 1986 yuan 
Agriculture  Industry  Other 
Coastal Region:           
Shanghai  (R1)  3,471  4.4%  71.9%  23.7% 
Beijing  (R1)  2,130  9.1  62.3  37.7 
Tianjin  (R1)  2,040  10.2  62.7  27.1 
Liaoning  (R1)  1,299  18.6  62.9  18.5 
Jiangsu  (R2)  1,064  32.9  51.1  16.0 
Zhejiang  (R2)  1,042  31.7  48.3  20.0 
Guangdong  (R2)  897  37.1  36.0  26.9 
Shandong  (R2)  770  41.3  42.2  16.5 
Hebei  (R3)  673  32.0  49.5  18.5 
Fujian  (R2)  672  38.9  38.1  23.0 
Guangxi  (R2)  450  47.6  31.3  21.1 
Central Region:           
Heilongjiang  (R3)  997  27.2  55.2  17.6 
Jilin  (R3)  823  33.2  47.5  19.3 
Hubei  (R3)  805  40.3  41.4  18.3 
Shanxi  (R3)  682  21.1  53.9  25.0 
Hunan  (R3)  603  47.8  34.4  17.8 
Anhui  (R3)  599  48.7  34.7  16.6 
Jiangxi  (R3)  543  47.2  35.2  17.6 
Henan  (R3)  540  41.6  39.2  19.2 
Inner Mongolia  (R4)  505  41.6  37.1  21.3 
Western Region:           
Xinjiang  (R4)  740  44.9  31.8  23.3 
Qinghai  (R4)  698  34.8  34.8  30.4 
Ningxia  (R4)  616  38.4  36.0  25.6 
Gansu  (R4)  570  29.8  42.8  27.4 
Shaanxi  (R4)  531  34.9  43.7  21.4 
Sichuan  (R3)  515  43.4  36.4  20.2 
Yunnan  (R4)  453  45.4  35.9  18.7 
Quizhou  (R4)  406  46.0  35.0  19.0 
National Average    746  33.8  45.7  20.4 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, 1988, p.55 and 57. 
Note: Here and in tables below, our quadri-partite regionalization is given in parentheses where Region 1 (R1) is the 
most developed northeast coastal region, Region 2 (R2) the southeast coast, Region 3 (R3) the central region, 
and Region 4 (R4) the western region. Tibet and Hainan are not included. LIU AND YOON: CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM AND REGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS 
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per capita 1986 
(ratio of national average) 
Average annual 
output growth rate
b   
1987-91 (%) 
Coastal Region:       
Shanghai  (R1)  6.4  3.9 
Beijing  (R1)  3.0  6.0 
Tianjin  (R1)  3.3  2.9 
Liaoning  (R1)  1.7  3.7 
Jiangsu  (R2)  1.4  8.6 
Zhejiang  (R2)  1.1  9.6 
Guangdong  (R2)  0.7  19.6 
Shandong  (R2)  0.7  11.4 
Hebei  (R3)  0.6  8.0 
Fujian  (R2)  0.5  13.2 
Guangxi  (R2)  0.3  8.8 
Central Region:       
Heilongjiang  (R3)  1.0  4.6 
Jilin  (R3)  0.9  5.5 
Hubei  (R3)  0.8  4.1 
Shanxi  (R3)  0.7  6.1 
Hunan  (R3)  0.5  4.9 
Anhui  (R3)  0.4  6.5 
Jiangxi  (R3)  0.4  5.7 
Henan  (R3)  0.4  7.3 
Inner Mongolia  (R4)  0.5  7.1 
Western Region:       
Xinjiang  (R4)  0.5  11.1 
Qinghai  (R4)  0.5  6.9 
Ningxia  (R4)  0.5  8.3 
Gansu  (R4)  0.5  5.1 
Shaanxi  (R4)  0.5  6.4 
Sichuan  (R3)  0.4  7.1 
Yunnan  (R4)  0.3  10.0 
Quizhou  (R4)  0.3  7.1 
aSource: World Bank,  China: Macroeconomic Stability and Industrial Growth under Decentralized Socialism, 
Washington: World Bank, 1990, p.132.
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Table 3  Provincial Comparison (2) 
Industrial Output Share in % (1986) 





Coastal Region:         
Shanghai  (R1)  80.1  56.4  7.2 
Beijing  (R1)  76.7  67.9  6.2 
Tianjin  (R1)  78.3  58.3  3.7 
Liaoning  (R1)  71.9  62.0  4.8 
Jiangsu  (R2)  46.4  32.0  27.0 
Zhejiang  (R2)  41.3  20.2  27.0 
Guangdong  (R2)  56.7  37.1  10.5 
Shandong  (R2)  61.5  41.2  12.2 
Hebei  (R3)  70.0  45.2  8.2 
Fujian  (R2)  65.0  31.2  6.6 
Guangxi  (R2)  78.9  41.1  3.8 
Central Region:         
Heilongjiang  (R3)  81.0  60.2  2.7 
Jilin  (R3)  75.2  48.8  3.2 
Hubei  (R3)  71.5  45.2  8.2 
Shanxi  (R3)  75.1  50.8  9.6 
Hunan  (R3)  72.6  43.8  7.9 
Anhui  (R3)  71.3  39.8  8.2 
Jiangxi  (R3)  77.9  43.8  6.5 
Henan  (R3)  74.9  45.1  6.1 
Inner Mongolia  (R4)  80.6  47.7  2.4 
Western Region:         
Xinjiang  (R4)  84.2  45.5  2.2 
Qinghai  (R4)  82.6  43.1  1.6 
Ningxia  (R4)  80.8  49.9  3.7 
Gansu  (R4)  89.0  68.8  3.2 
Shaanxi  (R4)  82.6  58.8  5.0 
Sichuan  (R3)  74.1  45.9  9.0 
Yunnan  (R4)  79.0  54.1  5.4 
Quizhou  (R4)  84.1  59.7  4.6 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, 1988. LIU AND YOON: CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM AND REGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS 
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Now, our net output value in real terms can be written as 
 
Adjusted   NOV(t) = GOV(t)/P(t)ꎭMC(t)/Pm(t)ꎭdepreciation.
6                (1) 
 
c. Adjustments for Input Variables 
 
The two input variables are labor and capital. Labor refers to the number of people 
employed (in ten thousand people). Since people are normally employed full time in China, 
working hours can be ignored. Capital refers to net fixed assets (in ten million yuan). A 
problem with the Chinese industrial data is that it overstates labor and capital data. Chinese 
industrial units employ substantial quantities of labor for non-industrial purposes such as 
education, medical care, etc., while capital data include residential construction and other 
investment for service facilities, such as schools, and health clinics.
7 Thus, our capital and 
labor variables are proxies for inputs used for industrial production. 
For capital input, the Statistical Yearbook of Chinese Industrial Economy reports 
cross-province and time series data for the following: fixed asset (FA) as the sum of original 
book values in purchase year prices; net fixed asset (NFA) as the difference between FA and 
DEP. 
To obtain real capital, we first compute investment (I) in current prices by 
 
) 1 ( ) ( ) ( - - = t FA t  FA   t I .                                              (2) 
 
Then, real capital is deflated NFA (nfa) given by the recursive formula: 
 
nfa(t) = nfa(tꎭ1) + I(t)/PK(t)ꎭdepreciation,                                (3) 
 
where PK is the nationwide capital price index which we compute as a weighted average of 
the price indexes for both the machinery and building materials industries. The weights are 
set at 38:62, respectively, which are the average shares of investment in equipment and 
non-residential construction for 1978-1985 based on Chen et al. (1988, Table A1).
8 The 
output price index (P(t)), the material price index (Pm(t)), and the capital price index (Pk(t)) 
are as listed in Tables 4A, 4B, and 4C. Data for net real output (Q), labor (L), and real capital 
(K) are summarized in Table 5. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The estimation model is a variation of Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), which 
deals with the problem of time-varying technical inefficiency measurement with panel data.   
 
6. Depreciation is in book values. 
7. For detailed Chinese input and output data problems, see Chen et al. (1988). For labor and capital data problems 
in developing countries, see Leamer (1984). 
8. Chen et al. (1988) also shows that this ratio is close to a constant. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Table 4A  Province-wide Output Price Index: 1986=100 
Year 
Province 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Beijing  108.53114  125.46258  150.07332  155.72229  163.50506 
Tianjin  107.99333  124.86183  149.12481  155.39955  163.81841 
Hebei  107.6478  123.96661  146.96987  153.54047  163.67277 
Shanxi  106.53929  121.2443  142.30854  149.40551  161.71283 
Inner Mongolia  109.76119  126.0304  148.42965  154.14722  164.38777 
Liaoning  107.26212  122.6451  145.42922  152.29491  163.57 
Jilin  109.58369  126.28103  149.59374  153.99989  161.88204 
Heilongjiang  109.43915  123.88916  143.48784  148.68297  160.77158 
Shanghai  107.94105  125.20471  150.37597  157.04683  165.20045 
Jiangsu  107.99534  125.66042  150.71187  156.64095  163.86401 
Zhejiang  108.38446  126.21415  151.04439  156.89081  163.99926 
Anhui  108.15129  124.94427  147.87423  153.38427  162.44473 
Fujian  110.34862  127.94071  151.55255  155.66065  162.29378 
Jiangxi  108.83756  125.39063  148.97508  154.95186  164.59624 
Shandong  107.80397  124.21437  146.77091  152.84486  162.33067 
Henan  107.55694  123.86511  146.52116  152.46256  161.82024 
Hubei  107.90813  124.70233  148.68489  155.35229  164.84639 
Hunan  108.12636  124.61173  147.95757  153.48929  162.44307 
Guangdong  108.34266  124.3966  147.56064  152.84983  160.73383 
Guangxi  108.7889  125.8193  149.0187  153.79415  161.15734 
Sichuan  108.15102  124.71249  148.11565  153.55037  162.03547 
Guizhou  107.53986  122.99677  145.19246  150.67897  159.99119 
Yunan  108.70782  125.36579  147.81973  153.37185  162.84468 
Shaanxi  107.37165  123.5755  147.69789  153.4633  161.04448 
Gansu  107.22737  121.49786  142.23235  149.46023  162.92399 
Qinghai  107.68203  123.21613  145.75022  151.72455  161.59329 
Ningxia  107.06747  121.85981  143.20405  149.21651  159.93077 
Xinjiang  107.23757  122.3634  142.2143  148.95898  161.85659 
Whole country  108.10025  124.65013  148.09796  154.07203  163.06846 
Source: State Statistical Bureau,  China Price Statistical Yearbook, 1990-92; State Statistical Bureau,  China 
Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook, 1988-92. 
Note: The output price index for each province is the weighted average of the producer sale price indexes of 14 
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Table 4B  Material Price Index: 1986=100 
Year  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Material Price Index  111  133.42  168.65  178.09  194.30 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Price Statistical Yearbook, 1990-92. 
 









86  100.00  100.00  100.00 
87  104.90  105.60  105.33 
88  117.28  119.75  118.81 
89  142.14  148.01  145.78 
90  146.12  147.42  146.93 
91  150.21  156.41  154.06 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Price Statistical Yearbook, 1990-92.
 
aCapital Cost Index = (38*Machinery Price Index + 62*Building Materials Price Index)/100. 
 
Table 5   Summary Statistics: Provincial Means of Variables
a 
  Net Real Output (Q)  Labor (L)  Real Capital (K) 
1986  1063.62 (753.27)  2539.52 (1661.42)  1933.53 (1078.59) 
1987  1205.31 (852.94)  2600.48 (1706.91)  2223.83 (1263.25) 
1988  1384.39 (952.99)  2679.45 (1766.02)  2508.56 (1459.74) 
1989  1490.34 (1025.11)  2689.09 (1738.46)  2778.22 (1646.34) 
1990  1506.43 (1032.07)  2731.18 (1750.77)  3038.42 (1851.44) 
1991  1751.45 (1297.50)  2830.96 (1846.25)  3440.94 (2220.89) 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook, 1988-92; State Statistical Bureau, 
China Price Statistical Yearbook, 1990-92. 
a Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Means and standard deviations are across n=28 provinces. 
Labor is in ten thousand people. The price indexes with the base year of 1986 were used to have Net Real 
Output and Real Capital in ten million 1986 constant yuan. 
 
We assume a fixed individual effect and a Cobb-Douglas production function to obtain the 
following fixed effect model of provincial output:
9 
 
Yjit = ájt + Xjit ß + åjit (j=1,...J ; ij=1,..., Nj ; t=1,...,T),                         (4) 
 
where j, i, and t are indices for regions, provinces, and time periods, respectively. Here, Y is 
log of the net output value (lnQ), and X denotes a vector of log labor (lnL) and log capital 
(lnK).  ájt = áꎭUjt, and represents the individual effect for each j. Statistical noise å is 
assumed independently and identically distributed with mean 0 and variance  ó
2.  0 ‡ U  
 
9. The random effect model estimates have produced essentially the same results which are available upon request 
from the authors. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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represents technical inefficiency.   
A special feature of the model is that the intercept terms ájt vary over time as well as 
over regions. We specify ájt by a flexibly parameterized function of time:   
 
ájt = á1j + á2jt + á3jt
2                                                  (5) 
 
so that (4) can be written as  
 
ln Qjit = á1j + á2jt + á3jt
2 + ß1 ln Ljit + ß2 ln Kjit .
10                            (6) 
 
Regional productivity levels in terms of total factor productivity are given by ájt. 
Comparison of ájt across regions, given t, provides regional differentials in productivity. The 
changing pattern of regional productivity differentials can then be measured by changing the 
time period. If a convergence in (total factor) productivity does happen, the differences in the 
ájt term across regions should  decline over time. Thus, the estimates of  ájt enable an 
empirical test of convergence of regional productivity differentials over the post reform era.
11   
Regarding the functional form of ájt, we test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is 
á3j=0 for all j (referred to as HL later) which means a linear form rather than a quadratic form. 
The second one is á2j=á3j=0 for all j (referred to as HC later), which implies that productivity 
and relative efficiency levels do not change over time. Therefore, we need to estimate three 
fixed effect specifications. 
 
IV. Estimated Results   
 
The estimated results of the fixed effect models are in Table 6. The results of the 
hypothesis tests tell us first that we cannot reject HL. Specifically, the observed value of the 
F(4,154) statistic testing HL is 0.8492, while the critical value is 2.43 at a 5% significance level. 
HC is rejected with the observed value of 2.0132 for F(8,154) statistic, while the critical value 
at a 5% significance level is 2.00. Maintaining HL specifies  
 
ln Qjit = á1j + á2jt + ß1 ln Ljit + ß2 ln Kjit  ( j=1,...J; ij=1,...,Nj; t=1,...,T ).        (7) 
 
Thus, the estimated model (7), as given by the Model 2 column of Table 6, is used to obtain 
the estimates of the productivity differentials exp(ájt) across region j and time t. According to 
 
10. The Translog production function has also been estimated but most of its second order coefficient estimates turn 
out statistically insignificant. 
11.  An alternative Cobb-Douglas model to estimate convergence is using as a direct measure of total factor 
productivity a weighted average of capital and labor productivity, weights being the factor shares. See Bernard 
and Jones (1996). The direct total factor productivity approach, however, requires perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale. Perfect competition may not yet be a tenable description of Chinese economy even 
under market socialism reforms. The constant returns to scale assumption in our model is rejected as shown in 
Table 6. LIU AND YOON: CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM AND REGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS 
  37 
the estimated exp(ájt) in Table 7, Region 1 is the most productive region, and Region 2 is the 
second most productive. It is clear that these coastal regions continue to show higher 
productivity than the other two regions in the sample period. Region 4 starts with the lowest 
productivity level but it surpasses Region 3 in later years. 
 
Table 6   Estimated Fixed Effect Model
a 
Parameter  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
1 b   ꎭ0.5254(8.480)  ꎭ0.5170(8.393)  ꎭ0.4152(8.274) 
2 b   ꎭ0.5332(7.879)  ꎭ0.5430(8.074)  ꎭ0.6661(12.933) 
11 a   ꎭ0.8521(ꎭ3.850)  ꎭ0.8702(ꎭ4.564)  ꎭ1.0769(ꎭ5.897) 
12 a   ꎭ1.1835(ꎭ5.810)  ꎭ1.1589(ꎭ6.392)  ꎭ1.1717(ꎭ6.459) 
13 a   ꎭ1.4372(ꎭ7.392)  ꎭ1.3477(ꎭ7.435)  ꎭ1.4446(ꎭ7.995) 
14 a   ꎭ1.4914(ꎭ8.359)  ꎭ1.4055(ꎭ8.707)  ꎭ1.4583(ꎭ9.316) 
21 a   ꎭ0.0120(ꎭ0.138)  ꎭ0.0066(ꎭ0.350)   
22 a   ꎭ0.0638(0.891)  ꎭ0.0398(2.378)   
23 a   ꎭ0.0926(1.671)  ꎭ0.0184(1.492)   
24 a   ꎭ0.1093(1.760)  ꎭ0.0364(2.726)   
31 a   ꎭ0.0009(0.075)     
32 a   ꎭ0.0033(ꎭ0.329)     
33 a   ꎭ0.0105(ꎭ1.364)     
34 a   ꎭ0.0103(ꎭ1.197)     





2 R   ꎭ0.9995  ꎭ0.9996  ꎭ0.9995 
Sample Size  168  ꎭ168  ꎭ168 
aParenthesized figures are t-values unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. White’s heteroscedasticity consistent covariance 
estimates were used for adjusted t-values which turned out similar to the reported unadjusted t-values.   
bParenthesized figures for scale coefficients (â1 +â2) are estimated t statistics with the null hypothesis (H0: â1 +â2=1) 
being constant returns to scale. The large positive t-values show that in all three models the constant returns to scale 
hypothesis (H0) is rejected in favor of increasing returns to scale. 
 
Table 7   Regional Productivity Levels over the Sample Period 
(measured by exp(ájt) = exp(á1j + á2j t)) 
Year  Region 1  Region 2  Region 3  Region 4  St. Dev.
a  Coef. of Var.
b 
1986  0.4161  0.3266  0.2647  0.2543  0.0743  0.2356 
1987  0.4134  0.3398  0.2696  0.2638  0.0702  0.2184 
1988  0.4107  0.3536  0.2746  0.2735  0.0666  0.2031 
1989  0.4080  0.3680  0.2797  0.2837  0.0635  0.1897 
1990  0.4053  0.3829  0.2849  0.2942  0.0612  0.1789 
1991  0.4026  0.3985  0.2902  0.3051  0.0597  0.1711 
aFour region standard deviation measured in %.
 
bCoefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the four region mean. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Although Region 1 is the most productive throughout the sample period, its productivity 
has declined slightly during the period, while all other regions show increasing productivity. 
The declining productivity is due to the negative estimate of á21 coefficient of  ꎭ0.0066 (see 
Table 6). Although the estimate is statistically insignificant, non-increasing productivity of 
Region 1 seems unsettling and requires explanation. One factor behind the declining 
productivity estimate of Region 1 is that our sample period of 1986-1991 overlaps a 
downturn in Chinese macroeconomic cycles. According to a post-1950’s business cycle 
study of China by Imai (1996), the eighth cycle of 1982-89 exhibits an upswing in 1982-88 
and a downturn in 1989, before the upswing of the ninth cycle begins in 1990.
12 Thus, our 
estimates of absolute productivity levels among regions tend to be lower than with the trend. 
But comparisons of regional productivity differentials based on these estimates are still valid 
to the extent that the macroeconomic cycles affect regions more or less equally. Another 
factor resulting in the declining productivity of Region 1 relates to the particular nature of 
economic reform in China that the market mechanism is introduced but not completely. The 
reform may require many inefficient enterprises to be closed, but they survive under 
continuing government supports. Enterprises could not lay off employees as market forces 
dictate. This problem is especially serious in such areas as Region 1, where state-owned and 
large- and middle-sized enterprises dominate, and where old industrial bases are well 
established. Consequently, the slightly declining productivity estimate of Region 1 can be 
justified. 
For relative differentials in the regional productivity levels, Table 8 and Figure 1 
provide for each region and each year the estimated regional productivity level as a 
proportion of that of the most productive region. The table shows that productivity 
differentials have narrowed between the most developed and industrialized region (Region 1) 
and all other regions. Over the sampled six year period, Region 2 has moved the fastest to 
catch up with Region 1 in productivity, from 78.8% of Region 1 productivity in 1986 to 
99.0%, virtual equality, in 1991. This spectacular growth performance of Region 2, which 
confirms the Coastal-led development, does not occur at the sacrifice of the growth of the 
interior regions. For both Region 3 and Region 4 narrow their productivity gaps with the 
most productive Region 1 over time. Region 4 has improved its productivity as a proportion 
of that of Region 1 significantly from 61.1% in 1986 to 75.8% in 1991, surpassing the level 
of Region 3 after 1988. The catch-up rate of Region 3 is slower; nevertheless, its relative 
productivity improves from 63.6% of that of Region 1 to 72.1% over the period. 
The annual dispersion measures of regional productivity levels also indicate shrinking 
regional differentials. Table 7 shows that the standard deviation of regional productivity 
levels falls from 0.0743 in 1986 to 0.0597 in 1991. The coefficient of variation gives a 
similar result: a decrease from 0.2356 to 0.1711 over the period.   
If we extrapolate our estimates of regional growth trends directly into the future, a 
concern arises that Region 2  would increase its productivity gap with all other regions, 
overshooting Region 1. This would worsen the regional disparity in productivity in the future. 
To a large extent, however, the growth of Region 2 is due to high investment and special 
 
12. For Chinese business cycles, see also Naughton (1987; 1995). LIU AND YOON: CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM AND REGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS 
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incentives the government granted this region in order to encourage foreign capital in the 
initial stage of the coastal development. Hence, over time, this initial advantage of the region 
may subside, moderating regional disparity. Anyway, predicting the future disparity in 
regional productivity differentials is a risky task. What our empirical findings up to the end 
of the sample period demonstrate is an evidence of productivity convergence across regions. 
That is, total factor productivity differentials have narrowed across regions in China over the 
reform period.   
 
Table 8   Relative Regional Productivity Levels over the Sample Period 
(measured by exp(ájt) /exp(maxj ájt)) 
Year  Region 1  Region 2  Region 3  Region 4 
1986  100%  78.5%  63.6%  61.1% 
1987  100%  82.2%  65.2%  63.8% 
1988  100%  86.1%  66.9%  66.6% 
1989  100%  90.2%  68.6%  69.5% 
1990  100%  94.5%  70.3%  72.6% 





Figure 1  Relative Regional Productivity Levels over Time JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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V. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the pattern of changes in regional differentials in total factor 
productivity in Chinese manufacturing and attempts to determine whether China’s economic 
reform introducing market mechanism into the economy, via decentralization-regional 
specialization according to comparative advantage and freer regional-international trade 
amidst the Coastal-led development, has worsened the gap between developed and less 
developed regions. Comparing estimated total factor productivity levels among four regions 
for the years since the industrial reform began, we do not observe worsening of regional 
disparity. Rather, we find a convergence pattern. Over the post reform period, regional 
productivity differentials of Chinese industry have shrunk. That is, economic reform, by 
introducing the market mechanism, has reduced regional disparity in manufacturing productivity. 
This finding alleviates the concern that market reform in China worsens regional disparity, at 
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